This article seeks to provide an original approach to WMD-related illicit trade by drawing on criminology and focusing on the transactional level. Specifically, the article discusses the "rational choice" model as a way to understand an entity's involvement in illicit trade, and considers also the limitations to this approach, as well as the role that opportunity plays in an actor's decision to engage in illicit trade. The article draws the conclusion that prospects for deterring illicit trade using export controls and related criminal sanctions are limited. Beyond the clear limitations of rational-choice model, the prospects for deterring illicit WMD trade are limited by the low levels of certainty in exportcontrol enforcement, something that the criminology literature suggests is of greater importance than severity of punishment in deterring crime. Nonproliferation successes are more likely to be found in further efforts to develop tools to address proliferation opportunities, an area which has already seen much work. Efforts to further raise illicit WMD-related trade from the realms of "invisible crime" are necessary, including further conceptual research on illicit trade. The article is structured in four main parts. The first summarizes the role of these actors in proliferation and then considers the intersection-both in practice and the academic literaturebetween proliferation and crime. In the second, third, and fourth sections, the article draws on criminology's "rational choice" model, exploring its limitations as well as another criminology theory that focuses on the role of opportunity in causation.
involvement in illicit trade, raising awareness within industry and a greater role for Situational Crime Prevention are important measures to prevent future proliferation.
The criminalization of involvement in WMD proliferation
Diverse states have utilized the international marketplace to source goods for their nuclear, chemical, and biological-weapons programs and their means of delivery. The dual-use nature of many WMD-related technologies has meant that even the earliest programs drew on manufacturing capabilities and expertise from producers of goods for civilian use. Over recent decades, the manufacturing base for many of these items has expanded as manufacturing capabilities spread. The development of the nonproliferation regime led to increased restrictions on the acquisition and supply of these technologies, forcing proliferating states to utilize illicit procurement techniques. While Iranian and North Korean illicit procurement efforts have received much recent attention, a wide range of states have drawn on the international marketplace and utilized illicit procurement methods for their WMD programs. 2 The actors involved in these illicit procurement efforts are diverse in type and role, as well as in their relationship to the goods being sought. They range in size from large multinational corporations to small enterprises and include manufacturers, distributors, middlemen, and brokers, as well as actors that facilitate proliferation but who, in practice, never handle the goods being procured, such as financial institutions, insurers, and shipping agents. Proliferators cover the spectrum, from private-sector enterprises to state-owned companies, some engaged in legitimate business in addition to their illegal procurement activities. They also include individual procurement agents working directly for state programs, although these entities are not the focus of this article.
The goods that these actors provide are also diverse. This article focuses on actors dealing in technologies and equipment that would be used to produce material for nuclear weapons-rather than nuclear material itself-as well as technologies and equipment needed for chemical and biological weapons and their means of delivery. The illicit trade in turnkey manufacturing capabilities and the complete technical information package needed to construct such facilitiessuch as uranium enrichment plants or missile-production capabilities-has decreased. Rather, proliferators are more actively engaged in procuring constituent parts and the technologies and raw materials needed to produce them. These strategic goods are not usually supplied by the large defense, nuclear, and aerospace companies that often have substantial Internal Compliance Programs (ICPs) in place, but rather by firms in their supply chains, including smaller manufacturers and distributors. For the latter firms, however, establishing programs to ensure that their goods do not end up in a WMD program can be especially burdensome financially, given their more limited resources.
Although there is a long history of states seeking to prevent illicit trade and punish WMD proliferators, in recent years national governments have expanded their criminalization of this conduct, defined here as "the institutionalized process through which certain acts and behaviors are labeled as 'crimes' and 'outlawed. '" 3 This can been seen in a number of respects: in the general appreciation that contributing to a WMD or related missile program constitutes criminal conduct;
in the spread of legislation against proliferation at the national level, with associated mandated penalties; and the related evolution of new law-based tools used to counter proliferation and punish those facilitating it.
With regard to the first two points, United Nations Security Council resolution (UNSCR especially its implementation-means that some proliferators are able to operate in some jurisdictions with relative impunity.
Toward a greater understanding of proliferators and illicit trade
Given the increased criminalization of WMD-related activities, however fractured, the criminology literature can provide useful insights. The proliferation literature has tended to focus on the "proliferation behavior" of states or individuals working in bureaucracies of proliferant states, rather than on the role of external individuals and entities in facilitating the process. 9 Some scholars have considered the behavior of individuals trafficking nuclear and radiological materials, which is a much rarer phenomenon than the illegal transfer of dual-use technology and equipment. 10 Much of the literature on the behavior of individuals and entities operating in the latter space has taken the form of detailed case studies, particularly surrounding the extensive network operated in the 1990s and early 2000s by Pakistani nuclear specialist A.Q. Khan, with only a minority of these scratching the surface of individuals' motivations.
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Some attempts have been made, however, to consider the decision-making calculus of individuals or companies at the transactional level regarding whether to supply a WMD program or comply with nonproliferation controls barring such supply. 12 Additionally, the different types of actors and the varied levels of their awareness of the true nature of their activities have also been drawn together in a framework known as the "Four I's" typology. 13 This typology considers both noncomplicit actors who find themselves involved in proliferation ("innocent" and "ignorant" proliferators 14 ) and complicit actors who have knowingly sought out illicit business ("indifferent"
and "ideological" proliferators 15 ) and are driven in varying degree by financial and ideological incentives. The framework also takes account of individuals and large organizations, different parts of which may hold a greater or lesser understanding of proliferation-related transactions.
More recently, a "resilience" framework has emerged to explain how illicit procurement networks change and adapt. 16 However, the criminology literature, which can provide insights into both the factors shaping proliferators' involvement as well as measures to counter this, remains unexplored.
Apart from published case studies and estimated and partial statistics, much of the crime of proliferation remains undocumented. "Visibility" is important if actions are to be recognized as criminal, that is, "They must be witnessed, detected, and/or experienced." 17 In the criminology literature, the terms "hidden" or "invisible" refer to crimes that are largely unrecorded or understudied. 18 Illicit trade shares a number of characteristics presented in a typology of invisible crime, in part because much of it goes undetected. These elements include: no knowledge (i.e.,
there is little public knowledge that the crime is being committed); no statistics (i.e., the conduct is omitted from official statistics or incorporated on a limited basis); 19 no theory (i.e., as discussed above, little theoretical work has been conducted on illicit WMD-related trade); no politics (i.e., the crime is not an element of mainstream political debate); and no panic (i.e., the crime is not sensationalized in the media to the point of causing "moral panic" in society).
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Several factors contribute to this "relative invisibility" of illicit trade. 21 First, illicit trade and efforts to counter it are often conducted in secret; proliferators operate clandestinely to obscure their activities, while intelligence and enforcement agencies work secretly to uncover them. Second, illicit trade remains relatively invisible because it usually has no obvious victims; the WMD programs such trade supports are most often intended for deterrence, with possible use, a remote contingency. Nonetheless, illicit trade is not necessarily a "victimless crime." 22 Chemical weapons use by the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria represents a clear example of how industry may contribute to a program that has brought death and suffering to many. 23 Even in such cases, however, the role of illicit trade may not be readily apparent, and those involved, even knowingly, may feel divorced from these potential consequences. Third, discussion of the issue is confined to the relatively small community of nonproliferation experts. These three factors have led to limited interest and "moral panic" from the public. with WMD-related trade. 27 The scholarship in this area, for example, has explored the role of regulation, compliance, and enforcement-all concepts relevant to export controls. There are also synergies because these crimes also often occur in an "organizational context."
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With this background in mind, this article now proceeds to explore the rational-choice model found in criminology and its application and limitations to understanding involvement in illicit trade. The following section will also explore criminology's opportunity theory as a further possible explanatory tool for understanding proliferation motivations.
Gaining from proliferation: rational-choice theories
Rational-choice theories of crime originated with the classicist view that "crime is rational, self- shorter-term and are likely to be less stable because of potential disruption by the authorities or the instability of procurement channels. 36 An incipient illegal procurement can be exposed to suppliers, for example, if the purchaser offers to pay an unusually high price for the goods at issue or if its financial bona fides appear questionable.
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Systems of export controls are in place to regulate trade in sensitive technologies, with enforcement action taken against those who do not adhere. The system allows for the supplier state government to combine its secret intelligence on proliferation issues with the declared information about the potential transaction when assessing the risk of potential exports. Enforcement actions are-in theory-taken by national authorities when they uncover attempts by exporters to cheat the system or to baldly disregard licensing requirements altogether. Noncompliance can result in penalties, although these vary from country to country. Nonetheless, at least one concept provides a measure of clarity in the discussion of proliferation.
This is the concept of the "serial proliferator," a term used by officials to refer to individuals or companies-particularly those in China-involved in, and often sanctioned for, the repeated illicit procurement of WMD-related goods. 41 There is clearly some overlap between serial-proliferator behavior and serial criminality more generally, with serial offenders defined as those carrying out at least three crimes of the same type, with an element of continuity in their behavior. 42 These serial proliferators likely see gains that outweigh the growing risks and potential costs associated with their behavior. As greater and longer-term involvement in illicit activity likely raises the risk of detection, these serial proliferators often operate in jurisdictions with low or negligible risk of penalty.
Rational-choice theory and deterrence
Rational-choice theories of crime emphasize the role that deterrence can play in preventing criminal activity. Deterrence in this context is defined as "a philosophy of punishment that aims to prevent criminal activity through the development and application of effective and efficient sanctions." 43 Deterrence has two different facets: through denial-denying opportunities and making a criminal act more likely to fail-and the threat of punishment. 44 To be effective, it needs to demonstrate that "the pains and losses associated with apprehension and punishment will overshadow the possibility of criminal gain or profit." Deterrence is a key facet of efforts to prevent illicit trade in WMD-related goods. Nonproliferation efforts, through the export-control system or otherwise, can contribute to deterrence by denial.
Those considering involvement in illicit transactions would decide not to risk it because they perceive it to be too difficult. In this respect, nonproliferation tools help raise the perceived level of difficulty. Deterrence can also operate by communicating the risk of punishment. Export-control systems and enforcement efforts contribute to both of these forms of deterrence.
Distinction is often drawn between "general" and "specific" deterrence. In the current discussion, a state's effective implementation and enforcement of export controls with respect to all commodities reinforces and adds credibility to its efforts to deter illicit trade in WMD-related goods. 46 Some definitions of general deterrence also suggest "making an example of" specific offenders to demonstrate potential costs to the wider community.
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"Specific deterrence" has several dimensions. It can operate post-punishment, so that "the effects of legal punishment" extend beyond the initial penalty, persuading the penalized to prevent further involvement in illicit trade. 48 Specific deterrence also includes, in relation to industry's compliance with regulations, the pre-punishment deterrent effects of inspection and audit, as well as enforcement actions, even if only a warning is given and no penalty implemented. 49 The term "implicit" deterrence has also been used to refer to the "message" sent to industry "simply by the dissemination of governmental regulations."
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Those writing on illicit trade prevention have suggested that, although deterrence works to a degree against many parties, it is not effective not against "determined malefactors," although more severe penalties could enhance deterrence. 51 However, in the area of export controls, there is little 55 Tonry, for example suggests that there is evidence that "promptness" trumps "severity." Tonry, "Learning from the Limitations of Deterrence Research," p. 280. Nagin and Pogarsky suggest that tests of the celerity effect are scant. Nagin and Pogarsky, "Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extra-legal Sanction Threats into a Model of General Deterrence," p. 865. 56 Cheng's case saw a sentencing enhancement from three years to nine-years. 57 US Immigrations Customs and Enforcement, "Chinese national sentenced to 9 years for providing US goods to Iranian nuclear program," January 27, 2016, < https://www.ice.gov/news/releases/chinesenational-sentenced-9-years-providing-us-goods-iranian-nuclear-program>. Cheng received just "a few thousand dollars a year" in profits, once the dividends were distributed among thirteen co-conspirators. 59 Profits within the dual-use area are often more modest than those from other illicit trafficking activities-such as arms or narcotics trafficking-making WMDrelated commodity trafficking a less than rational choice for parties willing to engage in criminal behavior in the hopes of financial gain. Nor does the rational-actor theory always sufficiently explain the behavior of more complex organizational environments, which are often not unitary actors.
While it is uncommon to accrue significant wealth from involvement in WMD-proliferation, there may be other specific financial incentives. The literature on white-collar crime suggests that individuals often become criminals to avoid bankruptcy or failure, rather than to make their fortune. Strain theory suggests that failure to achieve highly valued goals creates "strain," or pressure, to deviate from legitimate activities. 60 In a similar vein, some research has also suggested that white-collar criminals are not so much greedy as they are afraid of losing what they already have.
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Evidence from other industries suggests that businesses do not think or behave in a mere costbenefit manner. Businesses are not "amoral calculators," purely interested in maximizing profit.
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Other political, social, environmental, cultural, and ideological factors also play a role in their outlook and decision making. Moreover, it is neither realistic nor possible to make decisions purely based on costs and benefits. The decisions of proliferators suffer from limited information-their view of the risks, for example, is incomplete. Simon has introduced the concept of "bounded" or "limited" rationality, which holds that the lack of complete knowledge and difficulties anticipating consequences and outcomes can limit the rational actions of individuals and organizations. 63 The social environment can also influence decisions. The concept of "differential association," for example, suggests that a person's associates shape their views on what is appropriate behavior.
Criminal behavior, according to this concept, is "learned in association with those who define such criminal behavior favorably and in isolation from those who define it unfavorably." 64 This could apply, for instance, to cases where one individual persuades another to join an illicit business venture.
Another limitation on the rational-choice model is the difficulty applying it to large organizations.
Even in cases where a company has a clearly stated approach to export compliance, employees do not always abide by it. For example, there have been cases of salesmen continuing to conduct illicit transactions against the policy proposed by the company leadership, such as what allegedly happened in the mid-2000s in a large Chinese state-owned enterprise. 65 While the rational-actor model may have value in explaining the actions of the leadership and the salesman in this case, approaches drawing on organizational theory may have more value in explaining the divergence at different levels in the organization, and the lack of a compliance culture. 66 A further limitation on the rational-choice model is the involvement of "unwitting proliferators"-either innocent or ignorant-who are unaware their goods contributed to a WMD program. 67 Their respect, proliferation is the result of an individual or organization's negligence, defined generally as the "failure to exercise a degree of care that a person of ordinary prudence (a reasonable man)
would exercise under the same circumstances" and "carelessness amounting to the culpable breach of duty." 68 
Deterrence reconsidered
There are limited prospects for deterring the involvement of individuals and entities in illicit trade.
This is not only because deterrence is ineffective against "determined malfeasants," as suggested in existing studies, but also because the rational-choice model is not ubiquitously relevant, and because national authorities have difficulty punishing those involved in illicit trade and communicating this to others who might choose this path.
As noted above, the criminology literature highlights the importance of punishment certainty in successful deterrence. Each stage required for the effective enforcement of strategic trade controls-detection, investigation, and prosecution-has its own distinct challenges. Investigating cases of illicit trade can take years, involving significant undercover work and cooperation with partners overseas. 69 This can be both difficult and expensive. Other challenges facing these investigations include questions over their legal basis, problems with interagency and intergovernment cooperation, and insufficient capacity of agencies tasked with pursuing these efforts. 70 Once illicit trade has been detected and investigated, prosecution presents further challenges.
Winning a criminal case can involve overcoming high evidential standards and proving criminal intent beyond reasonable doubt. There is also often a trade-off as to whether to prosecute offenders, or to allow illicit networks to continue to function. Allowing networks to carry on with their activities can allow enforcement agencies to gather more damning evidence, or to continue to collect intelligence about procurement architecture and the WMD program it is supplying.
Enforcement action can also have political dimensions. Considering the difficulties involved in pursuing export-control cases, some law-enforcement officials may prefer "to focus on traditional cases, things like drugs, bank robberies, illegal immigration," where it is easier to make progress and "buoy the statistics that make everyone in a bureaucracy look good." 71 In one particularly thorny politicized case, the US released several prominent convicted Iranian procurement agents from prison as part of a prisoner swap, and dropped the charges against several other fugitives, as the JCPOA implementation day passed. 72 As a result, US counterproliferation enforcement efforts have allegedly faced significant uncertainties since the conclusion of the Iran nuclear deal. 73 As with cases of white-collar crime, prosecuting export-control violators is more complicated than prosecuting street criminals, and they often face similar challenges. 74 Crimes such as murder and robbery, for example, are more obviously illegal, while the nuances of export-control legislationsuch as complex technical specifications and international supply chains-further complicate prosecutions. As scholars have noted, "as a means of controlling white-collar and corporate crime, the criminal justice system is difficult to use and has not been exceedingly successful." 75 their activities, various shortfalls in national export-control legislation, and difficulties in obtaining mutual legal assistance from foreign governments and the extradition of key parties.
The location of individuals and companies is also an important factor that can limit the prospects for deterrence. Entities based in territories with weak export controls and no appropriate extradition treaties with countries active in nonproliferation-in particular, the United States-are not threatened by the risk of punishment. The difficulty in gaining cooperation from foreign governments in prosecuting cases of illicit trade has led the US to impose nonproliferation sanctions against proliferators overseas. 78 These sanctions are highly targeted, being focused on specific individuals and entities which intelligence suggests have been involved in proliferationrelated transactions.
The implications of entities being designated -and thus the deterrent effect -varies according to the sanctions legislation used. However, being designated by the US government can have extralegal consequences, with large financial institutions and other businesses around the world frequently screening potential business partners against US lists. Ensuring that these measures punish those that they are being implemented against is challenging because entities frequently use aliases or establish front companies with different names to negate the effects of these designations.
The deterrent effect also likely depends on the nature of the entity in question. US-targeted sanctions imposed on proliferators based in jurisdictions where export-control enforcement is problematic, are an example. The threat of penalty is more likely to have an effect on larger businesses with legitimate business interests and more to lose from fines or asset freezes than on middlemen well-versed in establishing new front companies. 79 Similarly, businesses with wellestablished brands have more to lose than anonymous middlemen and brokers.
While the prospects for deterrence are thus limited, evidence suggests that fear of penalties can work alongside other factors to drive compliance efforts by legitimate industry. Such fear can cause businesses to put in place an ICP or beyond-compliance practices to reduce the risk of inadvertent transfers that could trigger penalties. Such deterrence would likely have a widespread impact, given the clear majority of legitimate businesses are more likely to be law-abiding than knowingly seeking to supply WMD programs.
The threat of further penalties on firms that have already been punished-perhaps a form of specific deterrence-has been shown to lead these companies to establish compliance programs. 80 Experience conducting outreach to industry in the United Kingdom suggests that specific deterrence through inspection may have utility. Those firms most at risk of being targeted by proliferation procurers for dual-use goods have often had some kind of contact with the authorities (although usually not resulting in noncompliance finding) and therefore often have more developed ICPs. 81 General deterrence also has an important role to play, with the risk of "blacklisting" working as a significant compliance driver for firms. 82 It should be noted, however, that the threat of penalties alone has limited explanatory value for why businesses go "beyondcompliance." 83 "Extra-legal" sanctions or consequences can also be important. These include reputational risks, with the perceived financial value of reputation viewed as particularly important. 84 They also can include other factors such as "fear of peer disapproval, embarrassment or social stigma." 85 Beyond fear, moral factors can also be important, especially in driving beyond-compliance behavior. 86 The criminology literature notes that these can be as great a deterrent as the legal consequences. 87 In sum, it is clear that there are a good number of limitations on the explanatory power of the rational actor model. While entities are unlikely to become involved in illicit trade unless they believe the benefits outweigh the costs, such a model is simplistic. Proliferation is not always hugely profitable, and other social, moral and organizational factors also have explanatory value.
The concept of deterrence through threat of punishment, a key tenant of efforts to prevent illicit trade, certainly has some value. However, the large number of barriers to ensuring that all those involved in illicit trade are punished means that there are challenges in putting this concept into practice.
Framing proliferation opportunities
Further insights for proliferation behavior can be gleaned by employing opportunity theory, a criminological approach that views "crime as a function of the characteristics of situations that offer the opportunity, to those inclined to take it, to benefit from an illegal act." 88 Like rationalchoice theory, it views humans as rational beings, but complements this insight with the notion that a specific opportunity for a criminal act must emerge. 89 The opportunity, which adds a situation-specific dimension to the explanation of crime, arises from a combination of factors including a time, location, target, and lack of effective guardians. 90 Opportunities can either present themselves or be actively created. 91 Opportunity-based models have been more frequently applied to street crime than to business crime, though Michael Benson of the University of Cincinnati and Sally Simpson of the University environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible," and seek to "make crime more difficult and risky, or less rewarding and excusable." 103 SCPs arguably provide a useful lens through which to consider nonproliferation measures; although a combination of deterrence and SCP measures are required to prevent illicit trade, enhancement of SCPs has and will continue to be beneficial for nonproliferation.
Proliferation experts-who have the greatest understanding of the specific opportunities for proliferation-are better suited than criminologists to develop appropriate SCPs. 104 This includes different nonproliferation actors at different levels responding to developments in proliferation and illicit trade. International organizations, governments, and industry can develop SCP measures to make illicit transactions more difficult. SCPs can modify the proliferation opportunity, increase the effort required to commit the offense, raise the risk of detection, reduce the rewards, and make it more difficult to justify or excuse. 105 The levels of awareness of illicit trade among industry actors are important in reducing proliferation opportunities. Efforts have been made to engage industry on these issues and raise the profile of illicit trade. Industry outreach has been conducted in many countries by international organizations, national governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and academia.
Some of these efforts focused on specific industrial sectors that are frequently targeted for their WMD-related goods, whereas other efforts have focused on broader exporter communities.
Besides general awareness raising, more specific tools have been developed to supplement exportcontrol systems and allow exporters to better judge the legitimacy of potential transactions. These tools, in some sense, address the "trust paradox," namely that being less trusting could reduce the overall possibility of being a victim of crime, but that it may also result in a decline in legitimate business. 106 These measures provide a structured means for businesses to better judge the risks in
